FRUS, Conversation between Israeli Ambassador Harmon to McGeorge Bundy, head of National Security Affairs February 16, 1961


Ambassador Harman suggested again that the United States would be well-advised to consider disarmament for the area. A subsidiary benefit would be halting the flow of Communist arms to Africa. He said Israel intelligence reveals that Communist elements in African countries are receiving arms, not directly from the Soviets but with the UAR as an entrepot.


FRUS,Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Near Eastern and North African Posts/1/ Washington, April 15, 1961, 5:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4-1561. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Meyer; cleared by Ludlow, Palmer, Eilts (NEA/NE), and Cargo (IO/UNP); and approved by Meyer who signed for Rusk. Sent to Khartoum, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Dhahran and repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

Arab scheme to develop strategy to destroy the State of Israel during the 1960s. Beginning ideology for the PLO.

At Arab League meeting at Shtaura last August, decision was made to establish Palestine “personality” or “entity” with implication of Algerian-type movement designed ultimately to eliminate Israel. While longer range plans include military organization and Palestine government, Arabs apparently plan take steps gradually. At last fall’s UNGA meeting, Arab UN delegates promoted concept of UN custodian for Arab properties left in Israel apparently as suitable first post-Shtaura gambit. They obviously (were) encouraged by new composition of UN, believing that through mutual back-scratching tactics they can parlay Afro-Asian and Soviet bloc votes into series of votes progressively hostile to Israel. Upset by Nkrumah’s opening speech which urged Near East states to be “realistic” and implied (that) Arabs should agree to Arab-Israel settlement, all Arab delegates engaged in lengthy harangues rehashing whole Palestine problem to “educate” new delegations.


The Johnson Plan

. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 10, 1962./1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, Vol. I, 8/10/62-8/16/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “this memo & 2 tabs sent 8/11/62 for Pres. wkend reading.”In your papers for the week end are two memoranda from the State Department dealing with Near East problems. One memorandum discusses Dr. Joseph Johnson’s proposals on the Palestine refugee problem. Tab 1. The other reviews United States policy toward Israel. Tab 2./2/ We have a meeting scheduled for Tuesday, August 14. The essential questions to be resolved are as follows:/2/Documents 15 and 14, respectively.1. Whether we should support the Johnson proposal which has only a slim possibility of acceptance by either the Arabs or the Israelis. The proposal is consistent with your discussions with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and our frequently announced position to the Arab States. It calls for giving the refugees the choice between repatriation to Israel, resettlement in some other country, or compensation for loss of property. The Israelis must object on the grounds that, one, there are no numerical limitations; two, they have already effected an exchange of population by taking in 500,000 Jewish refugees from Arab countries; and, three, that they have already taken in 50,000 Arab refugees. The Arabs will object because they take the stubborn position that all refugees should return to Israel. This plan would cost the United States about $30 million a year–if we are lucky.




Evidence of bad relations with Arab states.

  1. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)/1/Washington, September 29, 1962.3. Such an open capitulation at this point (on top of Hawks) would risk a disastrous Arab reaction. We’re already in plenty of trouble with Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc. Let’s not give the Soviets another free ride.

Arab hostility toward the U.S.

Numbers 4,5, 6, from March 6, 1963. Note number 179

Jewish community examiner

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